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I. INTRODUCTION 
By filing a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, a prisoner 
initiates a legal proceeding collateral to the direct appeals process.1 Fed-
eral statutes set forth the procedure and parameters of habeas corpus re-
view.2 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) first 
signed into law by President Clinton in 1996,3 included significant cut-
backs in the availability of federal writs of habeas corpus.4 This was by 
congressional design.5 Yet, despite the dire predictions,6 for most of the 
first decade of AEDPA’s reign, the door to habeas relief remained open.7 
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1. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622–23, 633 (1993). 
2. See, e.g., The First Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 25, 1 Stat. 73 (co-
dified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1257); The Second Judiciary Act of 1867, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 
13 §§ 755–766. 
3. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codi-
fied as amended as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–2255; 2261–2266 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 3599; 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A and FED. R. APP. P. 22). 
4. See id.; see also infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 128–146 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Kennedy) 
(stating that “what we have here is an undoing of the Federal Government’s rights to intervene in the 
State courts”). See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreword to RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE v (6th ed. 2011) (referring to AEDPA as 
“the atomic bomb” that shattered “the preexisting structure of habeas corpus law”). See generally 
James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases, 
67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 421–28 (2001) (reviewing rates of error and reversals in capital cases). 
7. See generally ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF 
LIBERTY 50 n.8 (2001) (discussing evidence that AEDPA was proving to add fewer additional re-
strictions than predicted); John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” And The “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 259, 273–87 (2006) (pointing out and documenting that, up to that point, AEDPA did not make 
a significant difference). Cf. Lynn Adelman, The Great Writ Diminished, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. 
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More recently, however, with little or no fanfare, much less an an-
nouncement that it was overturning its own precedent, the Supreme 
Court reinterpreted a key portion8 of the statute.9 Pursuant to this new 
interpretation, habeas corpus relief could become virtually unattainable. 
During the Supreme Court’s 2011–2012 Term, the Court denied 
habeas corpus relief to petitioners who demonstrated significant depriva-
tions of constitutional rights.10 This article describes these rulings;11 
however, they are highly unlikely to be isolated cases. Rather, whether 
by evolution of doctrine or by reversal of precedent, the Court has oblite-
rated the Great Writ in the arena of federal review of state court convic-
tions. 
At the root of recent obstacles to relief is the interpretation of a 
short, but key clause in AEDPA’s amendments to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1). Pursuant to the statute, a federal court may only grant a 
writ if a state court’s adjudication on the merits “was contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”12 In Williams v. 
Taylor,13 the Supreme Court interpreted this provision, ruling that by 
enacting AEDPA, Congress meant to change the long-standing de novo 
standard of review.14 In other words, the Williams Court determined that 
under AEDPA, federal courts owed some amount of deference15 to the 
legal and factual findings of the state courts. The larger challenge for the 
Williams Court remained: How does a federal court decide whether a 
state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, fed-
eral law?16 Does the “contrary to” clause apply to a different category of 
cases than those to which the “unreasonable application” clause applies? 
                                                                                                             
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 6 (2009) (noting that “[t]he grant rate is now so low that it can no longer be 
reasonably asserted that habeas corpus functions as ‘the greatest of the safeguards of personal liberty 
embodied in the common law’”); Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than 
the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 87–105 (2012) (presenting data that since Professor 
Blume’s study in 2006, AEDPA’s “bite” has gotten much worse and referring to the earlier post-
AEDPA years as “a sort of AEDPA grace period”). 
8. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (prescribes one set of 
circumstances under which a federal court may grant relief to a state prisoner). 
9. Reinterpreted contrary to its earlier interpretation. See infra Part II.B. 
10. See infra Part III.D. 
11. See infra Part III.D. 
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 401(b)(1) (1996). 
13. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
14. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506–07 (1953). Cf. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 287 
(1992) (claiming that Brown did not endorse de novo review as clearly as many believe). 
15. The amended version of § 2254 does not use the word “deference.” See Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 386 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
16. The exact language in the statute is “an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(emphasis added). Here and in the remainder of this article, this clause will be articulated as “the 
unreasonable application of federal law” or “the unreasonable application clause.” 
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And how does a court recognize when a state court makes an “unreason-
able application of law?” 
This article discusses the reasons why the interpretation or standard 
that defines the “unreasonable application” clause has proven to be most 
critical to the availability of habeas corpus relief. 17 In recent decisions, 
the Supreme Court has announced that a state court’s ruling will only be 
deemed an unreasonable application of federal law if no fair-minded jur-
ist could agree with it (the fair-minded jurist test).18 The Court’s own 
precedent and rulings do not promote the interests of justice. This article 
proposes replacing the standard with one that measures the incorrectness 
of the state court decision by asking whether an erroneous state court 
decision was “erroneous enough” so that continued deprivation of the 
petitioner’s liberty pursuant to such a decision outweighs the State’s in-
terest in finality.19 
Part II of this article provides background on the legal landscape. It 
summarizes the relevant pre-AEDPA state of the law and the evolution 
of AEDPA interpreting jurisprudence with regard to § 2254(d)(1). It also 
describes the jurisprudential path to the fair-minded jurist test. Part III 
focuses on the fair-minded jurist test. It sets forth its potential for injus-
tice and discusses how it is inconsistent with the established function of 
the writ and even with the articulated goals of Congress when it passed 
AEDPA. Part III also argues that the fair-minded jurist test goes beyond 
deference and that respect or deference to state court decisions can be 
achieved without it. Part IV proposes a more just standard for the unrea-
sonable application decision. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR GRANTING A FEDERAL 
WRIT AFTER A STATE COURT CONVICTION 
A. From Brown v. Allen to AEDPA 
An understanding of the course of modern habeas corpus jurispru-
dence provides an important backdrop for the issues and proposals set 
forth in this article. The best place to start is Brown v. Allen.20 In a 1953 
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter laid out guidelines for the lower 
federal courts to follow when hearing requests for habeas relief from 
state court convictions.21 In Justice Frankfurter’s view, the federal district 
                                                 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011). 
19. See discussion infra Part IV. 
20. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
21. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497–514 (1953). The Judiciary Act of 1867 extended 
the right to seek federal habeas corpus relief to state court prisoners. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28 
§ 1, 14 Stat. 385. However, the judiciary did not offer a comprehensive interpretation of how the 
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court should conduct a de novo review of the state court’s rulings on 
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact.22 In other words, 
while the district judge should carefully examine the state court’s reason-
ing and decision, the federal judge is obligated to independently decide 
questions of federal law and how they apply to a given set of facts by 
asking himself or herself, “Given my understanding of federal law, what 
do I believe is the correct decision?” 
In the decades following Brown, controversy surrounded the is-
suing of federal writs of habeas corpus for state court prisoners.23 The 
debate took various forms. While efforts at legislative reform were un-
successful until 1996, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Rehnquist 
handed down many decisions that dramatically curtailed the availability 
of federal habeas relief.24 
President Bill Clinton signed AEDPA into law in 1996.25 Many be-
lieved that Congress transformed AEDPA from a long-debated reform to 
reality in response to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City26 and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh against 
whom the federal government sought the death penalty.27 With regard to 
                                                                                                             
lower federal courts should consider and adjudicate habeas corpus petitions until Justice Frankfur-
ter’s decision in Brown. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 497. 
22. See id. at 508. Mixed questions are those that require a judgment of the legal significance 
of historical facts. See id. at 507. 
23. See generally Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, Public Policy Lessons from the Ro-
bert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 295 (1992); Kent Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitiga-
tion, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 928–44 (1998) (tracing and criticizing the 
evolution of habeas corpus); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). In the late 1980s former Justice Powell 
chaired a Commission created to consider habeas reform. The Commission’s report contained a 
number of proposals, some of which found their way into AEDPA. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., AD HOC COMM. ON FED. HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, COMMITTEE REPORT AND 
PROPOSAL 11 (1989), reprinted in Habeas Corpus Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 4737, H.R. 1090, 
H.R. 1953, and H.R. 32584 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Ad-
min. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 46 (1990). 
24. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (holding that new rules of criminal 
procedure would not retroactively apply to cases on collateral review); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 87–90 (1977) (holding that claims procedurally defaulted in state court could not be liti-
gated in federal habeas absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the default); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U.S. 465, 494–95 (1976) (holding that allegations of Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
violations no longer cognizable in federal habeas corpus). 
25. See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, 32 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (Apr. 24, 1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD 
-1996-04-29/pdf/WCPD-1996-04-29-Pg719.pdf. 
26. The bombing resulted in the deaths of one hundred and sixty-eight people, including nine-
teen children. Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing (last visited Aug. 24, 
2013). 
27. The Oklahoma City Bombing, INDYSTAR, http://www.indystar.com/viewart/99999999/NE 
WS06/110607007/RetroIndy-Oklahoma-City-Bombing (last updated Jan. 9, 2013); see also 142 
CONG. REC. H3599 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pryce); 142 CONG. REC. H3602 
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gekas ) (“It took us a generation to convince the people 
on the left that we ought to have a workable, reassurable, predictable death penalty that would in-
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the writ of habeas corpus filed after state court convictions, AEDPA 
made sweeping changes. For example, among other provisions, the new 
law imposed a one-year statute of limitations,28 made it difficult for an 
inmate to file successive petitions,29 and under certain circumstances, 
allowed for an even quicker resolution of petitions in death penalty cas-
es.30 However, the provision that struck most deeply at the heart of the 
spirit and history of habeas corpus was the movement away from de no-
vo review. Proponents of AEDPA sought to eliminate the ability of a 
federal judge to set aside a state court conviction whenever he or she dis-
agreed with the state court on a matter involving the application of feder-
al law.31 They supported a requirement that federal courts give a degree 
of deference to the state courts’ decisions.32 
How much deference or how to apply a deferential standard was 
ambiguously delineated in the final wording of AEDPA. The relevant 
language is contained in § 2254(d)(1): 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— 
                                                                                                             
exorably exact the punishment that was intended.”). While AEDPA contained numerous provisions 
not related to habeas corpus reforms such as assistance to victims of terrorism, international terror-
ism prohibitions; removal of alien terrorists, to name a few, many legislators saw the restrictions on 
habeas corpus it contained as an important and overdue step forward in accomplishing finality to 
criminal convictions and in the enforcement of the death penalty. See Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); 142 CONG. REC. H3601 (statement of Rep. Solo-
mon) (stating that “the [death penalty] provision alone is so important that it is more than sufficient 
justification for supporting this conference report today”). Massachusetts Congressman Joe Kenne-
dy, on the other hand, resented the inclusion of habeas reform in the broad anti-terrorism bill. During 
debate, Kennedy lamented that he would be forced to vote “no” on an otherwise worthy bill because 
of what he deemed to be irreparable damage to constitutional rights under habeas corpus. See 142 
CONG. REC. H3601 (statement of Rep. Kennedy) (“Habeas corpus has nothing to do with an antiter-
rorism bill.”); see also remarks of Congressman Watt of North Carolina 142 CONG. REC. H3602 
(statement of Rep. Watt) (“[W]e cannot sacrifice our constitutional principles because we are angry 
at people for bombing.”); 141 CONG. REC. S7808-09 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (complaining that AEDPA “goes far beyond terrorism and far beyond Federal prisoners” 
because it is wrong to sneak limits on access to habeas writs by state prisoners “into an antiterrorism 
bill that we all want to pass as quickly as possible”). 
 28. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 
 29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261. 
31. See infra notes 130–45 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 130–45 and accompanying text. On the other side, legislators such as Dela-
ware Senator Joseph Biden passionately opposed any move away from de novo review. See 141 
CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (arguing “this rule, the so-called rule of deference, turns 
habeas on its head. Placing primary responsibility for the Federal Constitution in the hands of State 
courts is a dramatic departure from this country’s historical principle, and that it is the Federal courts 
that should be the final arbiters of Federal law”). 
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]33 
Predictably, the statutory language raised a good number of inter-
pretation questions. For example: (1) Does the use of the word, “was” 
before “contrary to” mean that the federal court may only look to the 
state of the law at the time of the State court decision?34 (2) What is the 
difference between a decision that was “contrary to” clearly established 
law and one that was “an unreasonable application of” clearly established 
law?35 (3) What is the correct legal standard when the state court deci-
sion was not on the merits?36 These questions and others have been ans-
wered by federal courts over the almost two decades since AEDPA’s 
enactment.37 Most of these issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
Question two, however, which addresses jurisprudence regarding the 
meaning of AEDPA’s articulated legal standard, has central importance. 
B. Williams v. Taylor and the Supreme Court’s 2000 Analysis 
The first and still controlling case interpreting AEDPA’s standard 
of proof language was Williams v. Taylor.38 The Williams Court was di-
vided in its understanding of what Congress intended and what the Con-
stitution required. Justice Stevens insisted that Congress did not intend to 
require all federal courts to defer to state judges’ interpretations of feder-
al law.39 Justice O’Connor, however, writing for the majority on this is-
sue, disagreed.40 Along with Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Scalia, Justice O’Connor embraced the idea that Congress intended a 
significant change in the standard to be applied by federal courts, includ-
ing some degree of deference.41 Justice O’Connor’s opinion is cited as 
                                                 
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
34. The Supreme Court recently decided in Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011), that the 
correct reference was to established law as of the date of the state court decision. 
35. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–09 (2000). 
36. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009). 
37. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (ruling that the federal habeas court 
may only rely on the record that was before the state court). 
38. See generally Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A 
Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677, 698–
712 (2003) (providing extensive description of Williams). 
39. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 377.  Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Ste-
vens. Justice Stevens argued that without an unambiguous statement from Congress, the Court 
would be wrong to settle upon a construction of AEDPA that would require the federal judiciary to 
cede its Article III independent responsibility to say what the law is to the several States. Id. at 378. 
40. See id. at 399–410. 
41. In Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 300 (1992), Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion, 
in which she firmly rejected the notion that federal judges hearing habeas corpus petitions were 
required to defer to the State court based upon the Court’s precedent in Brown. See supra notes 20–
22 and accompanying text. However, in Williams, Justice O’Connor wrote that the AEDPA amend-
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the definitive judicial interpretation of § 2254(d)(1),42 and the analysis 
contained therein is a key element in this article’s thesis. 
Lower federal courts naturally issued numerous opinions interpret-
ing the new standard between 1966, when Congress enacted AEDPA, 
and 2000, when the Court decided Williams.43 With one important ca-
veat, Justice O’Connor chose the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation as her 
model.44 Under this view, the “contrary to” clause applies to circums-
tances different from those to which the “unreasonable application” 
clause applies.45 A state court decision is contrary to clearly established 
federal law when it erroneously decides a question of pure law contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent or if it applies the correct Supreme Court 
precedent to facts indistinguishable from those in relevant precedent and 
reaches a different conclusion.46 A state court decision is an unreasonable 
application of clearly established federal law when, though choosing and 
accurately stating the correct precedent, it unreasonably applies that 
precedent to the facts under consideration.47 With regard to the latter 
clause, the obvious follow-up question is, What constitutes an unreason-
able application of law to a set of facts? In her response to this question, 
Justice O’Connor disagreed with the Fourth Circuit.48 
How a court is to measure or determine whether a state court has 
unreasonably applied federal law is the most significant question in the 
                                                                                                             
ments could neither be ignored nor made ineffectual and the Brown de novo or independent review 
standard was a thing of the past. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 402–05.       
42. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 
(2006); Blume, supra note 7, at 292. 
43. See, e.g., Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767–68 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 
1107 (1997); O’Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1998); Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 
F.3d 877, 889, 888–90 (3d Cir. 1999). 
44. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. Although Williams came out of the Fourth Circuit, the Cir-
cuit had previously ruled on AEDPA’s standard of review in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999), overruled by Williams, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  
45. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. 
46. See id. at 405–06. As a basic illustration, imagine that on the merits, a state court has de-
nied a defendant’s claim that he was not advised of his rights prior to custodial interrogation. The 
federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court failed to apply the law of Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426 (1966), misunderstood Miranda, or applied Miranda to facts virtually 
identical to those in Miranda but reached a different result.   
47. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. Using the illustration in note 46, supra, the writ might be 
granted when the State court (1) applied Miranda (2) to facts different from the Miranda facts, (3) 
demonstrated a sound understanding of Miranda but (4) unreasonably applied Miranda to these 
different facts.  Unfortunately, the courts’ analysis of the unreasonable application clause is some-
what more complicated. In Green, the Fourth Circuit held that this clause also applied to two addi-
tional circumstances: when the State court unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme 
Court precedent to a new context; or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context. 
Green, 143 F.3d at 870. In Williams, Justice O’Connor saw no need to approve or disapprove of that 
portion of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 408–09 (concluding that “today’s 
case does not require us to decide how such ‘extension of legal principle’ cases should be treated 
under § 2254(d)(1)”).  
48. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. 
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implementation of AEDPA and its potential as a barrier to the interests of 
justice.49 This is not an overstatement. Many habeas corpus petitions call 
for the application of the “contrary to” clause. Far more, however, fall 
within the purview of the “unreasonable application” clause. This makes 
sense. A state court might be expected to cite to the correct Supreme 
Court case assuming the federal issue has been correctly identified. Ap-
plying law to facts, however, is a subjective task that more easily lends 
itself to differing viewpoints. Thus, the standard for determining reason-
ableness has far reaching implications for state prisoners seeking redress 
in the federal courts. The legal story ending with the Supreme Court’s 
current and highly restrictive articulation of that standard began in Wil-
liams. 
In Williams, Justice O’Connor defined “unreasonable application” 
by instructing federal courts to “ask whether the state court’s application 
of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” 50 In-
sisting on an objective standard, she rejected the definition adopted by 
the Fourth Circuit.51 The Fourth Circuit determined that an unreasonable 
application of federal law meant that the state has applied federal law “in 
a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable.”52 Jus-
tice O’Connor believed that this standard or test was erroneous53 because 
it would lead to a finding of reasonableness if even one jurist had applied 
federal law in the same manner as the state court had54 as long as said 
jurist was a reasonable jurist.55 According to Justice O’Connor, this add-
                                                 
49. See Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting with alarm that an 
erroneous standard for unreasonable application such as the fair-minded jurist test “would doubtless 
lead to the denial of virtually all petitions”). 
50. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 (emphasis added). 
51. See id. at 409–10. The Fifth Circuit endorsed this test as well. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 
F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997). 
52. Williams, 529 U.S. at 377 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998)); See al-
so Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999), overruled by 
Williams, 529 U.S. 362. 
53. Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.  Accord Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 (2001) (reiterating 
that Williams rejected the standard of “unreasonable ‘only when it can be said that reasonable jurists 
considering the question would be of one view that the state court ruling was incorrect’” (citation 
omitted)); see also Ides, supra note 38, at 746 (discussing how the Williams Court “rejected the 
Fourth Circuit’s ‘reasonable jurists would all agree standard’”). Justice O’Connor surmised that the 
Fourth Circuit adopted the reasonable-jurist test out of understandable confusion. She suggested that 
the circuit may have confused the inquiry with the Teague standard for deciding if a new decision 
actually creates a new rule for retroactivity purposes. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409 (citing Lambrix 
v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)). See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 1789. 
54. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens agreed that the 
Fourth Circuit’s unreasonable application test was flawed. See id. at 377–78 (stating “the statute says 
nothing about ‘reasonable judges,’ presumably because all, or virtually all, such judges occasionally 
commit error; they make decisions that in retrospect may be characterized as ‘unreasonable’”). 
55. Justice O’Connor provided a good example in Drinkard where the Fifth Circuit labeled a 
state court decision not unreasonable because the circuit panel itself was in disagreement (2–1 split) 
on the mixed issue of law and fact. See Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997).  
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ed an inappropriate element of subjectivity to the analysis.56 While her 
rejection of the Fourth Circuit’s test was straightforward, her prescription 
for the correct test was far less so. Designating “objectively unreasona-
ble” as the proper standard did little more than beg the question: What 
makes a decision objectively unreasonable? The imperfect nature of her 
prescription was not lost on Justice O’Connor.57 She admitted that “‘un-
reasonable’ is difficult to define.”58 She was not concerned, however, 
commenting that “it is a common term in the legal world and, according-
ly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning.”59 This was a bit of a 
punt. However, Justice O’Connor believed it sufficient for deciding Wil-
liams.60 In sum, the Williams majority’s interpretation of the amendments 
to § 2254(d)(1) was that Congress intended a degree of deference from 
the federal courts; a writ could only be granted when a State court used 
an incorrect legal standard (pure questions of law) or unreasonably ap-
plied federal law (to mixed questions); and courts are to judge unreason-
ableness using an objective standard.61 
C. Post-Williams Jurisprudence 
1. Adapting to the Standard 
Lower federal courts tested the usefulness of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams.62 If the lower courts were 
                                                 
56. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–10. 
57. See Steven Semeraro, A Reasoning-Process Review Model for Federal Habeas Corpus, 94 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 897, 923 (2003–04) (arguing that the “objective-reasonableness stan-
dard . . . leaves the lower federal courts at sea without a compass to guide their course”). Professor 
Semeraro makes the case that an objective analysis of reasonableness necessarily must include look-
ing to the actual views of respected judges.  See id. at 924. Absent this, he argues that the analysis 
becomes the subjective opinion of a federal habeas judge. See id.; see also Adelman, supra note 7, at 
16–19. 
58. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004) 
(stating in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, concurred with by Justice O’Connor, that “the question of 
what an ‘unreasonable application’ of law might be is difficult in some cases”). 
59. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. As this article examines in Part IV infra, reasonableness is a 
common legal term, but therein might lie part of the problem. It may be wrong and worse, even 
unjust, to blindly borrow the definition from one legal context (negligence, for instance) for use in 
another (right to habeas corpus relief from an erroneous state court ruling).   
60. The majority for whom she was writing reversed the circuit’s denial of relief. It found that 
the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision on the merits was both contrary to and an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.  
61. See id. at 399–410. 
62. After Williams, the Supreme Court did not have difficulty with the standard. Professor John 
Blume observed in 2006 that “[s]ince Williams v. Taylor, the Court has—for the most part—
gravitated toward a talismanic formulation of § 2254(d), which it incants before moving on to the 
merits of the petitioner’s claims.” Blume, supra note 7, at 293. See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 
782, 784 (2001) (finding the Texas court’s decision objectively unreasonable without explaining 
how it measured unreasonableness). For a discussion of Williams and its application in the years 
immediately following it, see generally Ides, supra note 38, at 709–58.   
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struggling with the standard, most did not say so. The courts routinely 
restated Justice O’Connor’s prescription that they smoke out “objectively 
unreasonable” state court applications of federal law and then made a 
decision—unreasonable or not unreasonable—providing a rationale 
sounding very much like they would have when courts were doing their 
former job of independently deciding if the state court’s decision was 
correct or incorrect.63 
This is not to say that the circuit courts did not attempt to refine the 
Williams definition of “unreasonable application.” Many did, likely be-
cause “objectively unreasonable” was far from self-defining. For exam-
ple, shortly after the Court decided Williams, the Second Circuit noted 
Justice O’Connor’s reassurance to habeas courts that federal judges were 
already familiar with the concept of unreasonableness.64 However, the 
Second Circuit felt less than reassured and pointed out that the term has 
different meanings in different contexts, lamenting the fact that “we have 
no experience in determining when a state court has made an unreasona-
ble application of constitutional law, as expounded by the Supreme 
Court.”65 Consequently, the Second Circuit crafted a refinement, holding 
that “the increment need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be 
limited to state court decisions ‘so far off the mark as to suggest judicial 
incompetence.’ We do not believe AEDPA restricted federal habeas cor-
pus to that extent.”66 Other circuits described the measurement process 
somewhat differently. For example, a Fifth Circuit panel determined that 
a state court decision is objectively unreasonable when it is “so patently 
incorrect as to be unreasonable,”67 a seemingly more deferential standard 
than the Second Circuit’s standard. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits also 
strived for a measure of how erroneous a state court’s application of fed-
eral law must be to be deemed unreasonable with the former describing 
that point as one “so arbitrary, unsupported, or offensive to existing 
precedent, as to fall outside the realm of plausible credible outcomes.”68 
                                                 
63. See, e.g., Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201–06 (11th Cir. 2005). 
64. See Francis v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 365). 
65. See id. at 109 n.12.  
66. Id. at 111 (quoting Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999)). The Court 
found that the New York court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable despite the fact that 
“only a small increment beyond error is needed to meet the standard of ‘objectively unreasonable.’” 
Id. at 113. Subsequent Second Circuit decisions followed the Francis v. Stone standard. See, e.g., 
Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 315 (2d Cir. 2001); Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 68 (2d Cir. 
2005). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit fashioned a similar standard. See DeBurgo v. St. 
Amand, 587 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 2009). 
67. Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001). Cf. id. at 565 (Jolly, J., concurring) 
(complaining that “[t]he majority’s analysis here is a tautology—it simply substitutes one protean 
phrase (patently incorrect application) for another (unreasonable application)” and that “[i]n the end, 
the majority’s lengthy journey to define ‘unreasonable’ is a circular one, and we are left at the point 
at which we started”).   
68. See Awkai v. Mitchell, 613 F.3d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2010) 
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And the Seventh Circuit described it as one “well outside the boundaries 
of permissible differences of opinion.”69 In an early Ninth Circuit post-
Williams case, the Court determined that the “clear error” standard, 
which requires a “definite and firm conviction” of the incorrectness of 
the state court’s decision, was the best fit.70 However shortly thereafter, 
the Supreme Court emphatically rejected the use of that analogy. 71 
Virtually all of the early post-Williams court of appeals’ opinions 
echoed Justice O’Connor’s position of rejecting what may be referred to 
as the “all reasonable jurists” test of unreasonableness. For example, the 
Tenth Circuit, understanding this and citing Williams, held that “the fact 
that one or even a few courts have applied precedent in the same man-
ner . . . does not make it ‘reasonable.’”72 On the other hand in 2003, in an 
opinion seemingly at odds with Williams, the Eighth Circuit stated that 
“different federal courts may resolve the questions before us differently. 
This diversity of opinion alone suggests the [state court] did not unrea-
sonably apply [federal law].”73 
2. Quiet Shift Toward the Reasonable Jurist Test? 
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Yarborough v. Alvarado74 
contained particularly significant reasoning. First, Justice Kennedy, writ-
ing for the Court, added a gloss or dimension to the “objectively unrea-
sonable” analysis when he postulated that whether an application of law 
is unreasonable might depend upon whether the legal rule being applied 
is a specific or general rule.75 The issue for the habeas court in Alvarado 
                                                 
69. See Collins v. Gaetz, 612 F.3d 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2010). In an earlier decision, a Seventh 
Circuit panel described unreasonableness as “not within the range of defensible positions.” Mendiola 
v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2000). These various articulations make one wonder 
how literally they should be taken. For instance, in comparing the articulated standard in Collins 
with the one in Mendiola, the Collins court was more deferential to the state by requiring the peti-
tioner to show that the state court’s decision was not merely outside of the range of acceptable posi-
tions, but well outside that range.       
70. See Tran v. Lindsay, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000). 
71. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (stating that “[t]he Ninth Circuit made an 
initial error in its ‘unreasonable application’ analysis . . . . The gloss of clear error fails to give prop-
er deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness”). Accord 
Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d. 1195, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). Cf. Ides, supra note 38, at 740–48 (criticiz-
ing the reasoning in Lockyer).  
72. Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Payne v. Massey, 339 F.3d 
1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that “the petitioner need not show that all reasonable jurists 
would disagree with the state court’s decision”). 
73. Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2003).  
74. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
75. See id. at 664. This dimension to the analysis caught on and was used by the Court in later 
cases. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (finding that, “because 
the . . . standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude . . . .”); Renico v. Lett, 130 
S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). But see Renico, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1875 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the fact that the substantive legal standard applied 
by the state court ‘is a general one’ has no bearing on the standard of review”). 
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was the state court’s ruling on whether Alvarado was in custody for Mi-
randa purposes when he gave a statement to the police.76 Justice Kenne-
dy categorized the Miranda custody test77 as a general rule and held that 
“[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching 
outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”78 Thus, when a state court 
applied a general rule, as opposed to a specific Supreme Court precedent, 
there is a broader range of reasonable applications—a greater likelihood 
that it will deserve deference when reviewed by a federal court. Second 
and most pertinent to this paper, Justice Kennedy seemingly endorsed in 
dictum the “reasonable jurists” test for objective unreasonableness. As 
part of his rationale for reversing the Ninth Circuit’s granting of a writ, 
Justice Kennedy mentioned that “fairminded jurists could disagree over 
whether Alvarado was in custody.”79 
Before examining whether this signified a shift in § 2254 (d)(1) in-
terpretation, it is helpful to address why this language from Alvarado is 
dictum. To begin with, the Court had no need to apply the unreasonable 
application test to at least half of the state court’s holding given that the 
Court believed it to be correct and deserving of validation even under de 
novo review.80 While the Court did not say the same in so many words 
about the remaining part of the state’s holding,81 it implied that it saw the 
state’s viewpoint as the correct one.82 Given the favorable view that the 
Court had of the state court’s decision, it became unnecessary for the 
Court to struggle with the test for objective unreasonableness. Moreover, 
the Court’s exact language is, “[i]gnoring the deferential standard of 
§ 2254(d)(1) for the moment, it can be said that fair-minded jurists could 
                                                 
76. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 659. The police are only required to advise a suspect of his or her 
Miranda rights if the suspect will be subjected to custodial interrogation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).  
77. The test is whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have felt free to 
terminate the interrogation and leave. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). 
78. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664 (construing Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308–09 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring)). According to Justice Kennedy in Alvarado, “If a legal rule is specific, the 
range may be narrow . . . . Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in applica-
tion over the course of time.” Id. “Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a sub-
stantial element of judgment. As a result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable 
requires considering the rule’s specificity.” Id. at 664.  
79. See id.  
80. See id. at 668. Alvarado argued that despite the fact that he voluntarily came to the police 
station and was interviewed in a non-coercive or even friendly manner, due to his age and lack of 
prior interactions with police, a reasonable person in his situation would not have felt free to leave. 
See id. at 659–60. As to Alvarado’s claim about the relevance of his lack of prior criminal history, 
the Court said that even under de novo review, the state court’s ruling should be undisturbed. See id. 
at 668.   
81. The remaining part is the issue of the relevance of Alvarado’s young age. See id. at 659–60.   
82. See id. at 665 (finding that it was not a difficult case and that the Ninth Circuit, which 
found that the state court was objectively unreasonable, “was nowhere close to the mark”). 
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disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody.”83 While puzzling, this 
statement suggests that the Court disassociated its reference to fair-
minded jurists from the unreasonable application clause of § 2254. 
Eventually, the Court would utilize the reasonable jurist84 test in a 
more straightforward way.85 In the meantime, while the Court later cited 
Alvarado in a number of § 2254(d)(1) opinions, it was more often for the 
principle that applying a general rule as opposed to a narrow one broa-
dens the range of reasonableness.86 It was not clear, however, that the 
Court was operating pursuant to the notion that a state court decision was 
not unreasonable as long as a reasonable or fair-minded jurist might see 
it the same way. Any shift to the reasonable jurist standard took form in 
Richter.87 
In Richter, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision to grant a writ to convicted murderer, Joshua Rich-
ter.88 With little if any fanfare, writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
used the reasonable jurist standard as his measure of objective unreason-
ableness.89 Admittedly, the lack of fanfare might partially be explained 
by the fact that any objective unreasonableness analysis took a back seat 
to a different but important and open question of law. When the Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied Richter’s appeal, it did so in a one sentence 
summary order. 90 How to apply § 2254(d)(1) dictates to a federal court’s 
review of a state’s summary order, was a sticky question. Section 2254 
requires the federal court to decide whether a state court’s decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States,”91 but how could the federal court make such a determination 
where the state court simply issued a summary order—one that says 
nothing more than “petition denied?”92 Should § 2254(d)(1) apply under 
those circumstances?  
                                                 
83. Id. at 664. 
84. The terms “reasonable jurist” and “fair-minded jurist” seem to be used interchangeably in 
case law and should be considered synonymous here as well. 
85. See discussion of Richter infra Part II.C.2. 
86. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009); Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 
1855, 1875 (2010); Wong v. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
87. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). 
88. Id. 
89. See id. at 786–87 (clarifying that the only questions for the federal habeas court is “whether 
it is possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those [state court’s] arguments or theories are 
inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court”).  
90. See In re Richter, 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1946 (Cal. Mar. 28, 2011). 
91. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
92. The problem ostensibly is that without any information about what precedent the state court 
applied or the reasoning used when applying precedent to the facts of a specific case, there is no way 
to decide whether the state court used the correct Supreme Court precedent and/or whether its appli-
cation of precedent was unreasonable.   
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Despite the fact that the state did not include the “summary order” 
issue in its petition, in its grant of certiorari the Court directed the parties 
to brief and argue it.93 Thus, habeas practitioners and jurists were particu-
larly anxious to see how the Court would rule on the summary order di-
lemma.94 When the Court decided Richter, the limelight focused on the 
Court’s decision that despite the issuance of a summary order by the state 
court, a petitioner was still required to fulfill his or her burden under 
§ 2254(d)(1).95 Moreover, while the parties plainly disagreed about the 
reasonableness of the California courts’ application of federal law, nei-
ther the petitions for and against certiorari nor the briefs on the merits 
devoted any attention to the standard or measure of reasonableness.96 The 
parties simply noted that “incorrect” was not the same as “unreasonable” 
and then each made extensive arguments for and against what could be 
characterized as the correctness of the state court’s decision.97 The briefs 
did not contain even one reference to how unreasonableness is to be de-
termined much less argument aimed at or opposed to changing the stan-
dard to make it more difficult to establish.98 
In or out of the limelight, Richter represents a shift in unreasonable 
application analysis.99 Unlike in Alvarado, where the Court found many 
reasons to fully agree with the state court making a finding of reasona-
bleness obvious, the Richter Court performed a more extensive reasona-
bleness analysis making that standard more pivotal. 
                                                 
93. See Richter, 130 S. Ct. at 1506–07 (2010). 
94. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 272 (remarking that whether AEDPA deference 
applied in summary denial cases “had divided the lower courts throughout the decade and a half 
following AEDPA’s enactment”). 
95. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (holding that “where a state court’s decision is unaccompa-
nied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no 
reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief”); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 
1091 (2013) (holding that Richter’s presumption that summary state court denials were adjudications 
on the merits applies where state court ruled on some but not all of petitioner’s claims); Marceau, 
supra note 7, at 108–16.  
96. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (No. 09-
587), 2009 LEXIS 2970; Brief in Opposition to Petition, Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 Richter (No. 09-
587), 2009 2971 (No. 09-587); Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (No. 09-587),  
2010 LEXIS 369; Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (No. 09-587), 2010 
LEXIS 663. 
97. See sources cited supra note 96. Richter petitioned the federal court for the Eastern District 
of California for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his attorney was ineffective within the mean-
ing of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the dictates of Strickland v. Wash-
ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1987). Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 783. The district court denied the petition. On 
appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. After a rehearing en banc, Richter 
won relief. Id. Four judges on the Ninth Circuit dissented, agreeing with the original panel that the 
writ should be denied. See id. 
98. See sources cited supra note 96. 
99. By “shift,” I mean that the Court moved away from a previously announced standard, but 
not necessarily that all cases afterwards reflected the shift. See infra Part III.D. 
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The Richter majority began its § 2254(d)(1) discussion with an ob-
servation about the provision’s application to a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.100 Under Strickland, the Court’s lead precedent for inef-
fective assistance claims, a reviewing court must evaluate the reasona-
bleness of defense counsel’s performance.101 The Richter majority criti-
cized the Ninth Circuit for confusing the Strickland reasonableness anal-
ysis with the reasonableness analysis required by § 2254(d)(1).102 In its 
view, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis involved merely an assessment of the 
reasonableness of Richter’s lawyer’s representation and any ensuing pre-
judice103 when the true question was the reasonableness of the California 
Supreme Court’s determination of the reasonableness of Richter’s law-
yer’s representation.104 In pronouncing its verdict that California had not 
unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, the Court said: “A state 
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas 
relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of 
the state court’s decision.”105 
For this principle, the Court cited Alvarado as if this were a long-
standing interpretation of objective unreasonableness.106 
If the Richter majority believed that it was deviating from its own 
precedent, it did not acknowledge so in the opinion. Thus, also absent 
was any justification for embracing the standard specifically rejected by 
Justice O’Connor and the Court’s majority in Williams, which for over 
ten years represented the definitive interpretation of § 2254(d). Perhaps 
Justice Kennedy lost patience with what he viewed as the overly gener-
ous grants of relief to state court prisoners by federal courts.107 The opi-
nion characterizes § 2254(d)’s purpose as just stopping “short of impos-
ing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected 
in state proceedings.”108 To Justice Kennedy’s mind, AEDPA’s amend-
ments to § 2254(d)(1) were designed to practically eliminate the oppor-
                                                 
100. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785.  
101. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Strickland instructs reviewing courts to afford great 
deference to decisions and strategies of counsel. See id. at 689. 
102. See Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785. Since Strickland requires deference to counsel and many 
believe that AEDPA calls for deference to state courts, some argue that federal habeas cases involv-
ing ineffective assistance of counsel claims require “double deference.” See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 
556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)  
103. Which would have been its only obligation under a de novo review.  
104. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785, 788.   
105. Id. at 786. The Court added that a “state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling 
on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error 
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagree-
ment.” Id. at 786–87. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. (emphasizing that “if this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant 
to be”). 
108. See id. 
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tunity of a defendant who was convicted in a state court to obtain federal 
review of constitutional claims.109 The rare exception, in his view, is 
when not one fair-minded jurist could agree with the state court’s under-
standing or application of federal law.110 The Richter majority opinion, 
however, offers no acknowledgement that the reasonable jurist test was 
not in line with the Court’s precedent.111 
III. THE “FAIR-MINDED JURIST TEST” FALLACY 
The fair-minded jurist test’s potential for causing injustice is best 
appreciated in the context of the purpose of the AEDPA and the tradition 
of the Great Writ.112 Before the passage of AEDPA, there was much de-
bate about whether it was necessary or appropriate to amend the law to 
restrict a state court defendant’s access to redress in the federal courts.113 
With AEDPA’s enactment, however, few would dispute that the pro-
restrictions, states’ rights and law enforcement movements won. With 
AEDPA, a state inmate trying to access a federal writ faced obstacles 
through a host of new, or sometimes tougher, procedural hurdles.114 And 
as indicated in Part II, the revised language of § 2254(d)(1) suggested the 
abandonment of de novo review.115 The amended version of § 2254, 
however, does not specifically speak of the federal courts’ giving “defe-
rence” to state court decisions.116 Moreover, the congressional debates 
reveal that even AEDPA’s supporters were not uniform in their under-
                                                 
109. See id. 
110. See id. at 786–87 (holding that habeas petitioner must prove that the error made by the 
state court left no possibility for fair-minded disagreement). 
111. The same was true of opinions issued by the Court in the wake of Richter. See, e.g., Cul-
len v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). When Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, addressed 
the unreasonable application question, he used the fair-minded jurist test citing to Richter. Id. at 
1402. No mention was made of the fact that the fair-minded jurist test was a change in the legal 
landscape. See id. at 1402. Interestingly, in her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor found that the 
state court did unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, and she too cited Richter and the fair-
minded jurist test. See id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
112. See 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 
(3d ed. 2012) (referring to habeas corpus as “the ‘Great Writ,’ as it has been called by the Supreme 
Court from John Marshall’s day to this”); FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 1; Brandon L. Garrett, Ha-
beas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 57 (2012).  
113. See infra notes 130–46 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. Several of these statutory changes simply 
codified or strengthened habeas restrictions put into place by the U.S. Supreme Court while others, 
like the statute of limitations, were entirely new.    
115. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 
(2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (recognizing that “it cannot be disputed that Congress viewed 
§ 2254(d)(1) as an important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved”). But 
see Williams, 529 U.S. at 378 (Stevens, J., concurring). It could be said that Justice Stevens’s opi-
nion in Williams took the position that AEDPA does not and cannot preclude de novo review in 
federal court.         
116. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
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standing of whether or how much deference AEDPA would require.117 
The fair-minded jurist test for unreasonableness amounts to a relin-
quishment of the power to review to an extent not likely envisioned at 
AEDPA’s enactment. 
A. The Test 
There are a few different ways the test has been articulated,118 but 
they all boil down to the same crucial question: When a state’s highest 
court rules on an inmate’s federal constitutional claim, the federal habeas 
court must ask itself whether any—even if only one—fair-minded jurist 
could agree with the decision.119 If the court answers in the affirmative, 
the federal habeas judge must deny the writ. Typically, the initial inquiry 
for the court is whether it agrees with the state court’s resolution of the 
claim.120 If it agrees, the denial of the writ is the required result, which 
was also the case even prior to AEDPA’s enactment.121 However, if the 
federal court disagrees with the state court holding believing that the 
state court erroneously applied federal law, it must nevertheless deny the 
writ if it believes that a fair-minded jurist somewhere could debate that 
conclusion. Of course, when a § 2254 claim comes before a federal ha-
beas judge, there will always have been a denial of that claim by a panel 
of state court appellate judges and by lower court judges in the state sys-
tem as well.122 When a § 2254 claim arrives before a United States Cir-
                                                 
117. See infra notes 131–46 and accompanying text. 
118. Compare Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 
(1999), overruled by Williams, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application means that state court 
has applied federal law “in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable”), with 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (question is whether “fair-minded jurists could 
disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody”). 
119. When the question is articulated as, “Is the state court’s conclusion ‘debatable amongst 
fair-minded jurists?’” its harshness is less obvious. This articulation might suggest that only state 
court decisions that would likely be supported by a significant number of fair-minded jurists should 
be allowed to stand. In other words, it conjures up an image of a close legal issue that could fairly be 
decided in more than one way. In truth, however, it is interpreted to mean that if any fair-minded 
jurist could agree with the state, its decision must stand. Moreover after Richter, § 2254 deference 
must be afforded to even summary denials by state courts. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying 
text. Presumably, this means that a federal court must consider whether any possible, even though 
unarticulated, rationale exists for the state’s decision that one fair-minded jurist might agree was 
correct.  
120. In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003), the Supreme Court held that there is no 
required order for applying § 2254(d)(1) and that at the outset of its analysis, a federal habeas court 
may legitimately choose to address whether the state court unreasonably applied federal law without 
first considering the matter de novo. Nevertheless, it may be more logical and easier for a court to 
first make up its own mind on the correct conclusion. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 1812–
32.  
121. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500–13. (1953). 
122. Habeas corpus petitioners challenging state court convictions are required to exhaust their 
state court remedies before filing claims in federal court. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982). The claim 
may be presented to the state court on either direct or collateral review, but must be litigated through 
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cuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court, there may 
well have been one or more additional jurists123 who agreed124 with the 
state court’s resolution of the claim.125 Must the deciding federal court 
deny the writ unless it is willing to imply that these jurists were not fair-
minded? Presumably the answer is yes. Justice O’Connor rejected the 
fair-minded jurist test when she wrote about the “unreasonable applica-
tion” in Williams v. Taylor because this line of inquiry inevitably leads to 
questioning the fair-mindedness of jurists.126 
B. Legislative Intent 
Statements made during the AEDPA congressional debates reveal 
lawmakers’ expectations regarding AEDPA’s practical impact. In addi-
tion to habeas reform, AEDPA contained amendments to existing law 
touching on a range of issues such as immigration, terrorist organiza-
tions, and governmental wiretapping.127 Most were hotly debated. In both 
the Senate and the House of Representatives, the debate regarding the 
proposed standard for granting a writ (i.e., de novo review versus a more 
deferential standard), followed noticeable themes. The bills that resulted 
in AEDPA were introduced just after the Oklahoma City federal office 
building bombing and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh as the principal 
                                                                                                             
the state’s appellate courts including seeking discretionary appellate review. See O’Sullivan v. 
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). Exhaustion does not include the requirement of asking the United 
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to the state’s highest court. See Lawrence v. Florida, 
549 U.S. 327, 333 (2007). 
123. Sitting on the federal bench. 
124. “Agreed with” is to be contrasted with “found reasonable.” A federal court is permitted to 
grant a writ if it finds that the state court unreasonably applied federal law. Therefore, the federal 
court need not decide whether or not it actually agrees with the state court or merely finds the deci-
sion reasonable. See supra note 121. Notwithstanding, oftentimes a federal court will agree with the 
state court (i.e., judge the decision to be correct) and it will say so. When this occurs, the judge or 
judges on that court join the state court judges in the pool of jurists who must be deemed not fair-
minded if the writ is to be granted by a higher federal court.  
125. This will not always be the case. A possible scenario is that a federal district court will 
grant a writ and the court of appeals will unanimously affirm resulting in the case reaching the U.S. 
Supreme Court with no lower federal judge having agreed with the state’s ruling or having found it 
reasonable.         
126. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In a dif-
ferent context in her previous opinion in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 304 (1992), Justice O’Connor 
had taken a similar position. Thus, in Williams she maintained: 
[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should ask 
whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively 
unreasonable. The federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a subjective 
one by resting its determination instead on the simple fact that at least one of the Nation’s 
jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did in the 
habeas petitioner’s case. The “all reasonable jurists” standard would tend to mislead fed-
eral habeas courts by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than an objec-
tive one.  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409–10. 
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
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perpetrator.128 Legislators predicted that McVeigh would be sentenced to 
death and the proposed legislation (as is reflected in its title, “Effective 
Death Penalty Act”) addressed perceived delays and obstructions to the 
implementation of the death penalty.129 Thus, during the floor debates, 
AEDPA’s proponents spoke of speeding things along and achieving fi-
nality of criminal convictions through amendments such as adding a sta-
tute of limitations and imposing strict limits on filing more than one ha-
beas petition or on a federal court’s conducting an evidentiary hearing.130 
Many legislators opposing AEDPA did not oppose these kinds of re-
forms, emphasizing that they took no issue with the goal of preventing 
delay.131 However those legislators, along with other opponents, were 
unhappy with the proposed change in the substantive legal standard.132 
These objections set the stage for a dialogue in which opponents la-
mented a deferential standard that they viewed as “the effective repeal” 
of federal habeas. And proponents responded by trying to reassure oppo-
nents that even with the passage of AEDPA, federal habeas review 
                                                 
128. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
129. See 141 CONG. REC. S7821 (daily ed. June 7, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles) (mention-
ing that one of his constituents whose husband was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing told him 
that her pain would “be much greater if the perpetrators were allowed to sit on death row for many 
years”); 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gekas) (stressing that 
the bill is necessary to ensure that death sentences handed down by juries in cases like the Oklahoma 
City bombing case will not be set aside or delayed by frivolous appeals); 141 CONG. REC. S7804 
(daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating that “Congress . . . ought to act to make 
the death penalty an effective deterrent.  This legislation will move precisely in that direction.”). 
130. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7822-23 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abra-
ham); Id. at S7829 (statement of Sen. Kyl). These AEDPA proponents pointed to delayed executions 
of inmates convicted in both federal and state courts.  However, federal habeas review of state court 
convictions provoked additional concerns. Lawmakers supporting AEDPA complained that federal 
habeas corpus “demeaned federalism.” 141 CONG. REC. S7821 (daily ed. June 7, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Nickles).  Several expressed frustration with the notion that state judges were less knowledgea-
ble in constitutional law than federal judges or inclined to be less fair. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 
H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (arguing that, “the State judge went to the 
same law school, studied the same law[,] and passed the same bar exam that the Federal judge did. 
The only difference is the Federal judge was better politically connected and became a Federal 
judge . . . it is unfair to assume ipso facto, that a State judge is going to be less sensitive to the law, 
less scholarly in his or her decision than a Federal judge.”). In fact, Senator Kyl of Arizona intro-
duced an amendment to the bill that would limit federal habeas corpus review to federal convictions 
only. See 141 CONG. REC. S7829 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Pursuant to this 
amendment, which was not adopted, if a prisoner is convicted in a state court, his or her only access 
to a federal court would be his or her petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court as part of the 
direct appeals process. There would be no possibility for federal post-conviction review absent in-
adequate state court remedies. See id.; Cf. 141 CONG. REC. S7806 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement 
of Sen. Biden) (introducing his amendment that would limit all habeas reform to federal convictions 
because terrorism cases are more likely to be prosecuted in federal court and because the interests of 
justice require that state court prisoners have meaningful access to federal review).  
131. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. at S7841. 
132. See, e.g., id.; 142 CONG. REC. H3612-13 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Wa-
ters); 142 CONG. REC. H3610 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Berman).  
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would remain alive and meaningful.133 Within these dialogues lies a win-
dow into the type of review envisioned by the authors of AEDPA.134 
The AEDPA sponsors drafted amendments to § 2254(d)(1) to re-
quire a measure of deference to state court rulings on constitutional 
claims.135 Consequently, the amended statute requires denial of a writ 
unless “the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was con-
trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”136 
Nevertheless, the statute does not use the word deference and contains no 
specific standard for measuring unreasonableness much less an intention 
that the fair-minded jurist test be utilized. The concerns expressed by 
AEDPA’s opponents during the debates suggest that they feared the use 
of a fair-minded jurist type standard137 and equated its use with the vir-
tual elimination of habeas corpus relief.138 Proponents answered these 
concerns by claiming that the new language continued to guarantee a 
meaningful review.  
For example, Senator Orrin Hatch stressed that the new amend-
ments continued to permit federal courts to set aside state court decisions 
that “improperly apply clearly established federal law.”139 Senator Arlen 
Spector promised that he wished to preserve the “detached, objective re-
view that federal courts give.”140 In his view, the new standard would 
“allow federal courts sufficient discretion to ensure that convictions in 
the state court are in conformity with the Constitution.”141 Similarly, 
Representative Henry Hyde tried to reassure opponents that a federal 
judge “always reviews the [s]tate court decision to see if it is in confor-
                                                 
133. See 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (claiming 
the new standard is “not a blank, total deference”); 141 CONG. REC. S7846 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) 
(statements of Sen. Hatch) (arguing that under amendments federal courts may still review “[s]tate 
court decisions that improperly apply clearly established Federal law”); 142 CONG. REC. S3472 
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statements of Sen. Specter) (responding to opponents’ concerns by saying 
“I believe that the standard in the bill will allow Federal courts sufficient discretion to ensure that 
convictions in State court have been obtained in conformity with the Constitution”); see infra notes 
140–143 and accompanying text. 
134. For additional discussion of the legislative history as it relates to the “unreasonable appli-
cation” clause, see generally Ides, supra note 38, at 693–97. 
135. See 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
136. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
137. See 141 CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming 
that amendments “put[] the Federal courts in the difficult position of evaluating the reasonableness 
of a State court judge . . . .”).  
138. See supra note 133. 
139. See supra note 134 (emphasis added). 
140. 142 CONG. REC. S3472 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Specter) (emphasis 
added). Senator Specter went on to mention that many state court judges are elected and subject to 
political pressures to which federal judges, appointed for life, are not. See id.; see also Richard A. 
Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (2006) (re-
marking that “elected judges exhibit less political independence than non-elected ones”).  
141. 142 CONG. REC. S3472 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statements of Sen. Specter).  
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mity with established Supreme Court precedence, or if it has been mi-
sapplied.”142 These encapsulations of the level of review under the 
AEDPA amendments belie the notion that Congress endorsed the idea 
that a federal judge should leave alone an erroneous state court ruling 
that a single reasonable jurist might agree with. To the contrary, to say 
that federal courts should act when state courts improperly apply federal 
law suggests less deference than that afforded by the fair-minded jurist 
test.143 The advocates of AEDPA were of the mind that a misapplication 
of federal law was akin to an unreasonable application. Granted, this may 
suggest that disagreement with the state court would be an insufficient 
reason for a federal judge to grant a writ.144 However, it also suggests 
that what they had in mind was that some measure beyond erroneous 
would qualify as an unreasonable application. It does not suggest that an 
erroneous state court decision should be left intact as long as a jurist 
somewhere, albeit a fair-minded one, would have ruled as the state did. 
Moreover, Senator Specter’s endorsement of the federal courts’ exercise 
of an “objective” review comports with Justice O’Connor’s reason for 
rejecting the fair-minded jurist test.145 
C. Does Showing Deference for State Court Judgments Require the Use 
of the Fair-Minded Jurist Test? 
First, it is worth asking whether AEDPA actually requires defe-
rence. As noted earlier, the statute makes no mention of deference. The 
notion that deference to state court decisions is what Congress had in 
mind stems, at least partly, from the public agenda of AEDPA’s propo-
nents.146 Congress passed AEDPA in response to years of complaints by 
a number of state prosecutors that the federal bench in habeas corpus 
proceedings too often undid hard-won convictions or death sentences, 
sometimes both.147 The state prosecutors’ lament sounded something like 
this: a horrible crime is committed against a citizen;148 the state invests 
                                                 
142. See 142 CONG. REC. H3602 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statements of Rep. Hyde) (empha-
sis added). 
143. The dictionary defines “misapply” as “badly or wrongly apply.” MERRIAM WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/misapply (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). It defines “im-
proper” as “not in accord with fact, truth or right procedure.” Id. 
144. It just may be that the comments of Senators Hatch and Specter and Representative Hyde 
imply a federal scrutiny that defers to state court decisions by paying them all due respect, but cor-
recting them when they are wrong.  
145. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
147. See id. 
148. It is logical that most habeas cases involve capital murder, other murders, or crimes al-
most as serious. Aside from the obvious reason that death row inmates have the strongest incentives 
to file habeas cases, these inmates have a statutory right to the appointment of counsel for this pur-
pose. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2012). Non-capital inmates serving the longest prison sentences 
have strong, if somewhat less, motivation to challenge their convictions in multiple forums as well.  
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time, money, and energy into bringing the perpetrator to justice; over a 
period of years, the perpetrator litigates both state and federal constitu-
tional claims as part of direct review149 and state collateral review;150 
claims that a defendant’s constitutional rights were violated are presented 
to and denied (maybe more than once) by the highest court of the state; 
after as much as ten or more years,151 the same constitutional claims are 
heard by a federal court; the federal court makes its own call on the va-
lidity of the claim(s); despite previous holdings by state court judges, a 
federal court requires that the whole process begin anew or worse, orders 
the defendant’s release; states are frustrated by what appears to be a lack 
of respect, even blatant disregard, for its considered rulings. It is of little 
wonder that despite AEDPA’s language, judges interpreting AEDPA’s 
meaning would see it as Congress’s effort to require some measure of 
deference to state court decisions. Thus, if the spirit of the amended 
§ 2254(d)(1) is deference, how is this to be fairly accomplished? 
A good place to start to answer this question is with the meaning of 
“deference.” Dictionaries define it as “humble submission or respect” or 
“courteous respect or regard.”152 These definitions capture what state 
courts saw as lacking in the pre-AEDPA era. States do not want a federal 
court to decide a defendant’s claim as if the state court had never ruled in 
the first place.153 Courteous respect or regard (or deference) requires that 
the state court’s decision be recognized and evaluated, not ignored by the 
federal habeas court.154 However, it is hard to imagine states taking the 
                                                 
149. Direct review of a criminal conviction refers to appeals of right and discretionary appeals 
to the state appellate courts and also includes a request for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme 
Court. For a useful chart of the phases of review, see ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (2d ed. 2011). 
150. State collateral review or state habeas corpus refers to a post-conviction challenge, usually 
initiated in the trial court, ordinarily raising issues not developed in the trial record. See HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 215–17. 
151. The delay is aggravating to the prosecution for several reasons. For example, resources 
must be invested in the particular case long after the jury verdict. The victim or victim’s family 
cannot obtain a sense of closure. Should a new trial be required all these years later, crucial wit-
nesses may no longer be available. See Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012) (comment-
ing that “any retrial here would take place three decades after the crime, posing the most daunting 
difficulties for the prosecution” (emphasis in original)). While those sentenced to prison terms are 
usually incarcerated during the appellate and post-conviction litigation, death sentences are frequent-
ly stayed.  
152. See MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deference; 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deference (last visited Aug. 25, 2013). 
153. This would be the essence of de novo review of mixed questions of law and fact. A de no-
vo review entails the federal court applying federal law to facts found by the state courts (or in li-
mited circumstances to additional facts proven in the federal court proceedings) without regard to the 
state courts’ legal rulings.  
154. Should federal courts first decide cases as it would in de novo review and then consider 
§ 2254(d) as a defense that bars relief? See supra note 121. This is an important question as some 
have taken the position that AEDPA does not violate Article III’s grant of power to the federal judi-
ciary only if understood not as a restriction on the federal court’s ability to review constitutional 
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position, at least not publicly, that its courts’ judgments, in capital or si-
milarly serious cases, should be left undisturbed even if they are quite 
clearly wrong on the application of constitutional law.  
While perhaps subtle, there is a difference between a court resolv-
ing a legal claim on a blank slate on the one hand, and incorporating in 
its review a close examination of the state court’s judgment on the oth-
er.155 Section 2254(d)(1) as amended by AEDPA requires regard for the 
state court decision by prohibiting the issuing of a writ unless the state 
has unreasonably applied federal law.156 The problem is that the language 
fails to prescribe a method for determining whether an application of law 
is unreasonable. 157 But surely the spirit of the concept of deference does 
not require a federal court to back away in all cases save for ones in 
which the state’s decision was “off the charts” in its incorrectness.158 Yet, 
the fair-minded jurist test requires just this. By its terms, the fair-minded 
jurist test means that a state court decision must be left uncorrected by a 
federal court unless it is so wrong that not a single fair-minded jurist 
could agree with it. Far more than deference, this test requires acquies-
cence.159 
D. Post-Richter “Unreasonable Application” Analyses 
It is difficult and perhaps too soon to gauge the impact of the 
Court’s embrace of the fair-minded jurist test. Since the Court decided 
Richter, it has routinely ruled against habeas corpus petitioners in cases 
involving the “unreasonable application” clause.160 There have been a 
significant number of Supreme Court opinions that convey impatience on 
                                                                                                             
questions and make rulings, but after review, as a bar to a habeas petitioner’s ability to obtain relief 
under certain circumstances.  
155. When a state court has issued a summary denial and therefore not giving a reviewing fed-
eral court the benefit of its reasoning, this would entail the federal court performing a close examina-
tion of the result and possible rationales for it. See Harrington v.  Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 
(2011). 
156. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
157. Id. 
158. It cannot be denied that the majority’s language in Richter conveyed a “we are getting 
tougher on habeas cases” message. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (proclaiming “[i]f this standard is 
difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be”); see also Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 
(2012); Ryan v. Gonzalez, 133 S. Ct. 696, 708 (2013). Nevertheless, habeas corpus relief could still 
be rare under a deferential standard not as rigid and virtually impossible to achieve as under the fair-
minded jurist test. 
159. Even before Williams, the Third Circuit was highly critical of the reasonable jurist test 
adopted by other circuits. See Matteo v. Superintendent, 171 F.3d 877, 889 (3d Cir. 1999) (com-
menting that “[w]e do not believe AEDPA requires such unanimity of opinion. Nor do we think it 
entails an examination of whether the jurists responsible for the state court decision are reasonable: 
such an approach . . . would doubtless lead to the denial of virtually all petitions”). 
160. See, e.g., Metrish v. Lancaster, 133 S. Ct. 1781, 1792 (2013); Nevada v. Jackson, 133 S. 
Ct. 1990, 1992–93 (2013) (citing Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770). 
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the part of some of the justices.161 Some of the justices perceived that the 
lower courts too often failed to give state courts the deference required 
by AEDPA.162 In a series of these post-Richter cases, the Court has is-
sued per curiam summary reversals.163 Whether these or other denials of 
relief are attributable to the harshness of the fair-minded jurist test is not 
clear. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that a strict application of the test 
would make it extraordinarily difficult for a habeas petitioner to prevail. 
Both before and after Richter, federal court § 2254 decisions fail to 
make clear, beyond a recitation of the standard, how unreasonableness 
has in fact been measured. In some cases a recitation of the § 2254(d)(1) 
standard is simply followed by the conclusion that, even if incorrect, the 
state court decision was not unreasonable.164 Others contain lengthy dis-
cussions of why the record might support the state court’s perspective.165 
The authors of these opinions may be of the mind that if the state court’s 
perspective can be rationally explained, it is per se reasonable.166 How-
ever, the opinions do not include any objective measures of the reasona-
bleness of the state’s legal conclusions. 
In the lower federal courts, the scale of outcomes has been more ba-
lanced. In some of these cases, judges or panels mention that the fair-
minded jurist test is the required standard.167 Yet in other cases, the stan-
                                                 
161. See, e.g., Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complain-
ing that “[i]t is a regrettable reality that some federal judges like to second-guess state courts” (em-
phasis in original)); Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2149 (stating that the Sixth Circuit’s decision is “a text-
book example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) pro-
scribes”).  
162. See, e.g., Nevada, 133 S. Ct. 1990; Parker, 132 S. Ct. 2148. In Richter, the majority criti-
cized the court of appeals for giving “§ 2254(d) no operation or function in its reasoning.” Richter, 
131 S. Ct. at 786.  
163. See, e.g., Parker, 132 S. Ct. 2148; Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012). When the 
Supreme Court issues a summary opinion, it grants the certiorari petition and, in the same ruling, 
adjudicates the merits of the question(s) presented without allowing briefs on the merits or oral ar-
gument. See Daniel J. O’Brien, Heeding Congress’s Message: The United States Supreme Court 
Bars Federal Courthouse Doors to Habeas Relief Against All but Irrational State Court Decisions, 
and Oftentimes Doubly So, 24 FED. SENT’G. REP. 320, 323 (2012) (noting the Court’s recent in-
creased use of summary reversals). 
164. See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1404 (2011). The same can be said about 
cases in which the courts find that the state court was unreasonable in applying federal law. See, e.g., 
Burr v. Branker, No. 1:01CV393, 2012 WL 1950444, at *8 (M.D. N.C. May 30, 2012), rev’d sub 
nom. Burr v. Lassiter, F. App’x 327 (4th Cir. 2013).  
165. See, e.g., DeCastro v. Branker, 642 F.3d 442, 451–56 (4th Cir. 2011); West v. Symdon, 
689 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2012).  
166. Cf. Ides, supra note 38, at 689–90. 
167. See, e.g., Simpson v. Warren, 475 F. App’x 51, 56 (6th Cir. 2012); Simon v. Epps, 463 F. 
App’x 339, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Secretary, 643 F.3d 907, 932 (11th Cir. 2011); Jones 
v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1044, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011); Ayala v. Wong, 693 F.3d 945, 961 (9th Cir. 
2012); Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1149 –50 (9th Cir. 2012); Burr, 2012 WL 1950444, 
at *2–3. 
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dard is an objectively unreasonable test.168 However, the analyses that 
follow the recitation of the standard are often quite similar to pre-Richter 
analyses.169 This is understandable given that both the “objective unrea-
sonableness” and the “fair-minded jurist” tests lack concreteness. The 
harm inherent in the newly embraced fair-minded jurist test, however, 
emerges where relief is denied with accompanying language that con-
veys the court’s belief that the current standard is meant to make a win 
for the petitioner—a rarity.170 
In Williams, Justice O’Connor rejected the fair-minded jurist test 
because she believed it was too subjective.171 In the post-Richter period, 
an interesting illustration of what she may have had in mind can be found 
in Elmore v. Ozmint.172 A South Carolina state court convicted Elmore of 
murder and sentenced him to death.173 After litigating numerous claims 
in state court on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings, he 
filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the 
District of South Carolina. The district court denied the claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel and denial of due process.174 The district court 
judge agreed with the state court’s resolution of these legal claims, as 
opposed to merely finding them to be reasonable.175 Thus, when Elmore 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, a 
ruling in his favor would imply that both the state court judges and the 
federal district court judge were not fair-minded jurists. Elmore neverthe-
less prevailed in the Fourth Circuit.176 Language in the Fourth Circuit’s 
majority and dissenting opinions demonstrates the subjective and even 
personal nature of the test. For example, the dissenting judge seems out-
raged by the realization that the majority’s “remarkable” decision reveals 
its belief that “every single judge to have previously considered this issue 
                                                 
168. See, e.g., Detrich v. Ryan, 677 F.3d 958, 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2012); Blystone v. Horn, 664 
F.3d 397, 417–18 (3d Cir. 2011); Guzman v. Secretary, 663 F.3d 1336, 1355 (11th Cir. 2011).  
169. But see Simpson, 475 F. App’x at 56, 65 (granting the writ and despite the fact that the 
Michigan Supreme Court ruled against petitioner, expressing the opinion that no reasonable jurist 
could conclude that petitioner’s rights had not been violated).  
170. See, e.g., Splawn v. Thaler, 494 F. App’x 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2012); Conley v. Warden, 
505 F. App’x 501, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2012). 
171. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
172. Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 2011). 
173. A South Carolina post-conviction court subsequently set the death sentence aside after it 
found that Elmore was mentally retarded and thus categorically excluded from the death penalty 
pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia. See id. at 848 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).  
174. See id. at 847. 
175. See id. 
176. See id. at 851; see also Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2013); Cornell v. Kirkpa-
trick, 665 F.3d 369 (2d Cir. 2011). The court of appeals panel in Cornell found that the state court 
decision was an unreasonable application of federal law despite the fact that the federal district court 
found that the state court decision was a “proper application of clearly established federal law.” See 
Cornell, 665 F.3d at 371 (quoting New York v. Kirkpatrick, No. 06-CV-0734 (MAT), 2010 WL 
161429, at *5 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010), rev’d sub nob. Cornell, 665 F.3d 369). 
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has been unreasonable.”177 To this the majority responds that the mere 
fact that previous judicial rulings all went against Elmore cannot be the 
“yardstick” it uses in making its determination.178 The majority forth-
rightly states, “If our opinion embarrasses anyone, so be it.”179 
IV. HOW FAR FROM CORRECT IS UNREASONABLE? BY WHAT 
MEASURE? 
Acknowledging that “unreasonable” is “no doubt difficult to de-
fine” in 2000, Justice O’Connor nevertheless expressed confidence in the 
ability of the federal courts to apply the new § 2254 because, as she sug-
gested, “it is a common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal 
judges are familiar with its meaning.”180 While this is true, the analysis of 
or test for reasonableness often varies with the context. For example, 
courts determine whether a search and seizure is unreasonable and there-
fore violates the Fourth Amendment181 by balancing an individual’s right 
to privacy and to be free from governmental intrusions against the state’s 
interest in uncovering needed evidence of a crime.182 Another legal con-
text in which reasonableness must be evaluated is in the many examples 
of when a person’s conduct or belief must be compared with that of the 
reasonable person.183 Both tort and criminal law frequently require this 
measure. Negligence or unreasonable conduct is a long-standing basis for 
tort liability.184 Simple negligence is less frequently the basis for criminal 
liability, however, many criminal cases turn on the reasonableness of a 
defendant’s perceptions and/or conduct as they relate to an element of a 
crime or defense.185 The reasonable person test common to torts and 
                                                 
177. Elmore, 661 F.3d at 877. 
178. See id. at 877 n.52. The majority granted the writ while unambiguously stating that it was 
observing the dictates of Richter. See id. at 856 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) 
(calling the state court’s adjudication “error well understood and comprehended in existing law 
beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement” (citation omitted))). After acknowledging the 
“constraints” AEDPA places on their scope of review and promising that it “faithfully” adhered to 
its “deferential standard,” the majority maintained that it is not its job to “rubberstamp the state PCR 
court” and that it “see[s] a meaningful role for the federal courts in safeguarding the constitutional 
rights of state prisoners  . . . .” See id. at 872.  
179. See id. at 873. 
180. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). 
181. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
182. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 
318, 347 (2001). Reasonableness determinations require a balancing of interests in other contexts as 
well. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1977) (regarding water usage).  
183. See Ides, supra note 38, at 688 (comparing tort law reasonableness analysis to that pro-
vided for in § 2254). 
184. See Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 
MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (1951). 
185. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (containing General Requirements of Culpability), 
§ 3.09 (regarding use of force) (1962). Even the concept of recklessness in criminal law relies upon a 
reasonable person comparison. See id. at § 2.02(2)(c). 
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criminal law has balancing at its root as well. While we understand that 
the hypothetical reasonable person is an abstract concept that may not 
even exist, on balance, we believe that holding citizens to this standard is 
in the interests of protecting society as a whole. In other words, holding 
everyone to this normative standard offers greater protection to us all.186 
Since context is an important consideration for choosing a reasona-
bleness standard, it is fair to ask why—in the context of federal habeas 
corpus—state court prisoners face what Professor Justin Marceau calls in 
his recent article, “one of the most uncharitable standards of review 
known to law.”187 A comprehensive discussion of the history of the Great 
Writ and its importance188 is beyond the scope and breadth of this article. 
Nevertheless, if context has relevance for defining unreasonableness, it 
seems useful to point to a few basic principles in order to create a vivid 
backdrop for discussion. While Congress passed legislation authorizing 
federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal prisoners in 
1789,189 the Judiciary Act of 1867190 established that prisoners incarce-
rated pursuant to state court convictions were also entitled to federal ha-
beas corpus review.191 While many believe that the purpose of the 1867 
Act was to protect newly freed slaves from unjust and retaliatory incarce-
ration,192 it has functioned to redress injustices on a much broader basis 
for well over a century.193 The writ’s function is to be “the best and only 
                                                 
186. See James, supra note 184, at 2 (explaining the need for an objective test of reasonable-
ness and stating that “if the standard of conduct is relaxed for defendants who cannot meet a normal 
standard, then the burden of accident loss resulting from the extra hazards created by society’s most 
dangerous groups . . . will be thrown on the innocent victims of substandard behavior”). Cf. State v. 
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) (finding that the appropriate reasonableness test is to 
compare the accused “from the standpoint of a person whose mental and physical characteristics are 
like [hers] . . . .”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt (1962). 
187. See Marceau, supra note 7, at 97. Professor Marceau documents that habeas corpus relief 
under AEDPA has greatly diminished after an early period in which it appeared that AEDPA did not 
have the impact that was predicted. He argues that state court prisoners may stand a better chance of 
getting relief in federal court if they challenge the process or lack thereof in state court as opposed to 
the result of state court litigation. See id. at 137–97. 
188. See generally Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1038 (1970); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. 
L. REV. 143 (1952); NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 4–11 (2011). While primarily 
designed as a practitioners’ reference, Hertz and Liebman’s treatise, Federal Habeas Corpus Prac-
tice and Procedure, contains an excellent and extraordinarily well-documented recitation of the 
Writ’s history and significance. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 5–116. 
189. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Stat. 73. 
190. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Stat. 385. 
191. See id.; see also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 6, at 54–55. 
192. See Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 322 (1867) (stating “[w]hat was the purpose of [the 
Judiciary Act of 1867]? We all know . . . . [i]t was to relieve persons from a deprivation of their 
liberty under State laws; . . . to protect especially those who had formerly been slaves, and who, 
under color of vagrant and apprentice laws in some of the States, were being reduced to a bondage 
more intolerable than that from which they had been recently delivered”). 
193. See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN supra note 6, at 55–91. 
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sufficient defense of personal freedom”194 regardless of the motivation or 
cause of an unjust imprisonment. Historically speaking, the writ, as inhe-
rited from England, was intended to shield individuals from illegal deten-
tions ordered by the crown and later in this country, from illegal deten-
tions ordered by the executive branch of government.195 Nevertheless, 
when Congress extended the writ to cover illegal detentions ordered by 
states, it was the same writ of habeas corpus with no indication that its 
function was to be viewed any differently.196 Thus, we must be careful 
not to mistakenly assume that Congress intended any watering down of 
this crucial protection when it amended the statute with AEDPA. While 
the amendments to § 2254 were devised to require that state court deci-
sions be given considerable (and increased) respect by the federal courts, 
nothing in AEDPA or its legislative history suggests intent to diminish 
the protective promise of the Great Writ. 197 President Clinton’s signing 
statement revealed his expectation that courts would uphold the ideals of 
justice that underlie federal habeas corpus review despite AEDPA’s sta-
tutory revisions.198 To be sure, had AEDPA been intended as a dimi-
nishment of any individual’s right against unjust imprisonment, it would 
more than likely be unconstitutional.199 In the end, even under AEDPA, 
                                                 
194. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 
(1868)). 
195. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 129–37 (6th ed. 
1775); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 325–31 (1915); Adelman, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
196. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 500 (remarking that when Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 
1867, which extended the availability of the federal writ to state court prisoners, it “embedded into 
federal legislation the historic function of habeas corpus adapted to reaching an enlarged area of 
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people from unconstitutional action’” (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972))). Per-
haps, habeas corpus as a remedy for wrongful convictions by states is strongly analogous to the 
protection of citizens from politically motivated detentions ordered by the crown. As commentators 
on habeas corpus have noted, state court judges who are often elected to office may be motivated by 
politics in their decision-making. See supra note 141. 
197. See supra notes 138–143 and accompanying text. Even AEDPA’s proponents paid ho-
mage to the historical importance of the writ and tried to persuade its opponents that these principles 
would remain intact.  
198. See Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, supra 
note 25 (emphasizing that “[o]ur constitutional ideal of a limited government that must respect indi-
vidual freedom has been a practical reality because independent Federal courts have the power ‘to 
say what the law is’ and to apply the law to the cases before them. I have signed this bill on the 
understanding that the courts can and will interpret these provisions of section 104 in accordance 
with this ideal”). 
199.The concept of habeas corpus appears in the Constitution in what has been called, the Sus-
pension Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (providing “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may 
require it”). Therefore, significant restrictions on or interferences with access to federal courts to 
challenge illegal detentions raise constitutional concerns. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996). See generally 
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the concept of habeas corpus as “the basic safeguard of freedom in the 
Anglo-American world” 200 remains—at least in theory.201 It is therefore 
fair to juxtapose a consideration of unreasonableness against that histori-
cal backdrop. 
An inquiry about whether a state court decision that incorrectly ap-
plied federal law did so unreasonably should be performed with the 
ideals of the Great Writ in mind.202 As previously explained,203 the fair-
minded jurist test has the potential to affirm all but the most extremely 
incompetent decisions. Can it possibly be argued that the continued im-
prisonment or execution of a petitioner whose case was incorrectly de-
cided by a state court is justified as long as that decision may be sup-
ported by just one fair-minded jurist?204 Historically speaking, would it 
have been acceptable to detain or execute a petitioner unlawfully con-
victed because one additional jurist could be found who agrees with the 
State? Such a standard is almost impossible to imagine. 
The move to the fair-minded jurist test could very possibly be ex-
plained by the desire of many federal judges to curtail the granting of 
habeas corpus relief.205 Another plausible, if less political, explanation is 
that “objectively unreasonable”—an insufficiently defined concept—
                                                                                                             
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: 
A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1367–75 (2010).  
200. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953).  
201. Cf. Adelman, supra note 7, at 6 (citing a survey that documents the low grant rate under 
AEDPA). Judge Adelman, who sits on the federal bench and hears habeas cases, optimistically adds 
that “judges must understand that habeas corpus, notwithstanding the AEDPA, remains an important 
and workable remedy for a violation of a constitutional right and that they should not let it fall into 
disuse.” Id. at 34. 
202. During the Senate debates on the AEDPA, then-Senator Biden made this point when he 
argued against an unreasonableness standard. He stated: 
It is the lowest standard. It is one thing to apply that when we are protecting the public 
against environmental pollution. It is another thing when we are applying that standard to 
the application of constitutional rights to individuals. There we have always applied the 
highest standard. The Government has been required to meet the highest standard before 
they can put someone in jail or put them to death.  
141 CONG. REC. S7842 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
203. See supra notes 119–127 and accompanying text. 
204. In a separate opinion in Williams v. Taylor, Justice Stevens articulated the fallacy of the 
fair-minded jurist test quite well when he said: 
[T]he statute says nothing about ‘reasonable judges,’ presumably because all, or virtually 
all, such judges occasionally commit error; they make decisions that in retrospect may be 
characterized as ‘unreasonable.’ Indeed, it is most unlikely that Congress would delibe-
rately impose such a requirement of unanimity on federal judges . . . . Congress surely did 
not intend that the views of one such judge who might think that relief is not warranted in 
a particular case should always have greater weight than the contrary, considered judg-
ment of several other reasonable judges.  
529 U.S. 362, 377–78 (2000). 
205. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text.  
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proved to be too difficult to apply.206 Here is a useful way to consider the 
challenge: Imagine a Venn Diagram207 with three concentric circles. The 
innermost circle represents what the federal habeas court considers the 
correct application of federal law to the facts of a given claim. The space 
between this inner circle and the next (or middle) circle represents possi-
ble rulings on the same claim that are incorrect, yet reasonable.208 Final-
ly, the space between the middle and outermost circle represents possible 
applications of federal law that are both incorrect and unreasonable.  
Under AEDPA, if the habeas court agrees with the state court deci-
sion, that decision would belong in the innermost circle and the writ must 
be denied, as it would have been pre-AEDPA. However, when a habeas 
court disagrees with the state’s ruling, it must decide whether the state 
court’s incorrect ruling belongs in the middle or in the outermost circle. 
The only guidance the federal court has received is that decisions that are 
objectively unreasonable belong in the outermost circle. But how far 
away from that inner circle must the decision be to require that it be 
placed in the outer circle instead of the middle circle? It seems impossi-
ble to quantify. On more than one occasion, the Second Circuit has cha-
racterized the measure as follows: “[T]he increment of incorrectness 
beyond error need not be great; otherwise habeas relief would be limited 
to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incom-
petence.”209 Pursuant to this view, the middle circle would be quite nar-
row and contain only decisions that were just a bit wrong. Any additional 
increment of wrongness would push the decision into the outer circle and 
trigger the label “unreasonable application.” Admittedly, some of its re-
cent opinions reveal that a majority of the Supreme Court believes that a 
writ should be denied unless the state court’s ruling was quite far off the 
mark.210 However, this is inconsistent with AEDPA’s legislative histo-
ry211 and, more importantly, with the age-old function of the writ.212 A 
standard that labels a decision unreasonable if it is more than incorrect 
but not necessarily incompetent would be far more consistent with both. 
The rub, so to speak, is to identify how much of an increment beyond 
incorrect suffices and how to measure the distance. 
                                                 
206. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 501 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
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cation of habeas petitions). 
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A balancing test comparable to that used for unreasonable search 
and seizure claims may work in the habeas or § 2254(d)(1) context. Once 
a federal court determines that a state court ruling is incorrect, keeping in 
mind the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus, it should balance a petition-
er’s interest not to have his or her liberty deprived by an incorrect appli-
cation of federal law against the state’s interest in finality. The more 
wrong the state court decision, the more the scale should tip toward the 
petitioner. In other words, the federal court would undertake the follow-
ing analysis: 
(1) Did the state court’s decision involve an erroneous application 
of federal law? If not, the writ must be denied. 
(2) If it did involve an erroneous application of federal law, was the 
state court decision so wrong that continued deprivation of the petition-
er’s liberty pursuant to such a decision outweighs the State’s interest in 
finality? If not, the writ must be denied. This step should be undertaken 
with reference to the historical function of the Great Writ. 
If the balancing in step (2) tips toward Petitioner, the state court de-
cision involved an unreasonable application of federal law and a writ 
may be granted. 
Another, perhaps less methodical, way of describing the analysis 
above is to say that the habeas court, after deciding that the state court’s 
conclusion was wrong, must ask itself, “Is [the state court’s] decision so 
far from correct that it seems unreasonable to continue to deny the Peti-
tioner his or her liberty without correction?” This assessment should be 
performed objectively but necessarily entails the likelihood that each 
federal jurist will have his or her subjective view of in whose favor the 
scales tip. The same is no doubt also true when a court balances the in-
terests of the parties in any context. However, at least the federal court’s 
analysis need not involve any assessment of the fair-mindedness or rea-
sonableness of other judges. It is the latter form of subjectivity that Jus-
tice O’Connor rightly warned against when she rejected the fair-minded 
jurist approach. 
A balancing approach of this sort also makes sense given that after 
Richter, habeas courts are to give § 2254 deference even to state court 
summary decisions.213 In those cases, a federal court will be unable to 
receive the benefit of knowing, much less evaluating, the reasoning of 
the state court.214 Pursuant to the balancing approach, the federal court 
                                                 
213. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784.  
214. Almost a decade before Richter was decided, Professor Steven Semeraro wrote an article 
in which he recommended that under AEDPA, habeas courts should examine the state court’s rea-
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need only look at the result reached by the state court, decide whether it 
was correct and if not, consider whether it was erroneous enough to 
make it unreasonable to deny relief. Presently, under Richter, federal 
courts must construct all possible rationales for the state’s decision and 
then decide whether it is possible that a fair-minded jurist could agree 
with any of them.215 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is important not to lose sight of the forest for the trees. The trees 
represent the language of AEDPA and the judicial and scholarly interpre-
tations of its provisions. Also amongst the trees lie arguments in favor of 
interpreting AEDPA in a manner consistent with the interests of justice 
and the tradition of the Great Writ. In this analogy, the standard for de-
termining whether a state court has unreasonably applied clearly estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent could undoubtedly be considered a cru-
cial but single limb on a single tree.216 The forest, however, represents 
troubling questions about the overall fairness and desirability of the 
changes to habeas corpus brought by AEDPA as a whole. While beyond 
the more narrow scope of this article, this author sees AEDPA as an un-
necessary change, which sadly has stood in the way of just remedies for 
constitutional violations in the course of criminal prosecutions that pro-
vide a forum for provable claims of innocence.217 
If repealing AEDPA is not currently in the cards, its harshness can 
nevertheless be reasonably moderated through proper judicial interpreta-
tions of its provisions. The fair-minded jurist test, however, is an exam-
ple of a dangerous and improper judicial interpretation. The balancing 
analysis previously advocated218 is this author’s prescription for a more 
just standard consistent with the interests behind AEDPA and the Great 
Writ. Finding workable standards of this kind presents a very real chal-
lenge.219 Legal standards are mere words, and applying them is never a 
simple matter. Nonetheless, that is no excuse for choosing a standard like 
the fair-minded jurist test that virtually guarantees the denial of even the 
most legitimate claims. 
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